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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
By losing sight of the test for the scope of the employment, the Missouri
Supreme Court in the Phillips case has caused the embarrassment of the
court in the instant case in its application of the rules of respondeat
superior. It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court of Missouri will, on a
hearing of the instant case,1 5 put an end forever to the doctrine of Phillips
v. Western Union Tel. Co.16 R. T. S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ELECTIONS--RIGHT OF CONGREss TO REGULATE
P~imARms-[United States] .- The defendants, Commissioners of Elections,
conducted a primary election under the laws of the state of Louisiana to
nominate a Democratic party candidate for representative in Congress.
They were indicted in the District Court for Eastern Louisiana for having
wilfully altered and falsely counted the ballots of the voters. The charge
was based upon section 191 of the U. S. Criminal Code which makes it a
federal crime to conspire "to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
citizens in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured
to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States," in this case (1)
the right of qualified voters to have their votes counted as cast in a Con-
gressional party primary election and (2) the right of candidates in a
Congressional party primary to have votes cast for them properly counted.
A demurrer to the indictment was sustained by the district court on the
ground that no right "secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States" had been infringed. On review before the Supreme Court, held:
the rights of voters and candidates to have votes properly counted in a
Congressional party primary are "secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States" in Article I, sections 2, 42 and so are within the purview
of section 19 of the U. S. Criminal Code.-United States v. Classic.3
To sustain its view that the right to an honest count of votes in a Con-
gressional party primary was secured by the Constitution, and so was
within the purview of section 19 of the U. S. Criminal Code, the majority
of the Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Stone, found that Con-
gressional power to regulate the election of its members under Art. I, sec-
tions 2 and 4, extended to the conduct of primary as well as general elec-
tions.
15. The dissenting judge in the instant case has of his own motion certi-
fied the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri. Salmons v. Dun & Brad-
street (Mo. App. 1941) 153 S. W. (2d) 556, 566.
16. (1917) 270 Mo. 676, 195 S. W. 711, L. R. A. 1917F 489.
1. (1909) 35 Stat. 1092, c. 321, 18 U. S. C. A. 51.
2. U. S. Const. Art. I., §2: "The House of Representatives shall be com-
posed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several
states, and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite
for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature." U. S.
Const. Art. I., §4: "The times, places, and manner of holding elections for
Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the
legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter
such regulations, except as to places of choosing Senators."
3. (1941) 61 S. Ct. 1030.
19411
Washington University Open Scholarship
126 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
Although from the outset, Congress had the express constitutional power
to regulate the "times, places and manner of holding elections for * * *
representatives," 4 it did not exercise it until 1842.5 In that year it provided
that representatives were to be elected on a general ticket. There was no
further legislation for 24 years, when Congress regulated the manner in
which state legislatures were to choose United States Senators. Not until
1870 did Congress enact a comprehensive system of regulations for the con-
duct of Congressional elections,7 and this was repealed in 18948 with the
exception of sections 19-26, chapter III of the U. S. Criminal Code. Since
that time Congress has adhered to its earlier policy of legislating directly
by piece-meal only and adopting in each state the regulations of that state.
Congressional power to legislate with reference to Congressional general
elections 9 or to adopt as its own the legislation of the several states has
been undoubted. 10 But power to regulate Congressional party primaries has
been questioned, although the existence of such power has not before been
squarely affirmed or denied.11
The decision in the instant case would furnish the necessary constitu-
tional support for further direct regulation of Congressional party prima-
ries if Congress should see fit to legislate in that respect.' 2 From the stand-
point of the existence of constitutional power, as well as from the stand-
point of governmental policy, the decision is unquestionably sound.'8
But as Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the minority in dissent, points
out, the narrow question in the instant case was the applicability of section
19 of the U. S. Criminal Code. The position of the minority may be thus
paraphrased: (1) That before a right is "secured by the Constitution"
within the purview of section 19, it must be as explicit as "equal protection
of the laws" and Negro suffrage in the 14th and 15th Amendments; 14 and
4. U. S. Const. Art. 1, §4.
5. 5 Stat. 491, c. 47.
6. (1866) 14 Stat. 243, c. 245.
7. 16 Stat. 144, c. 114, 16 Stat. 254, c. 254. These statutes were supple-
mented in (1872) 17 Stat. 347-349, c. 415.
8. (1894) 28 Stat. 36, c. 25.
9. Ex parte Yarbrough (1884) 110 U. S. 651; In re Coy (1888) 127
U. S. 731; Swafford v. Templeton (1902) 185 U. S. 487; United States v.
Mosley (1915) 238 U. S. 383.
10. Ex parte Siebold (1879) 100 U. S. 371.
11. See Newberry v. U. S. (1921) 256 U. S. 232, which arose under the
Corrupt Practices Act of 1910, setting a limit on the amount which could
be expended by a candidate in any campaign for nomination or election to
congressional office. This act specifically referred to primary elections and
did not involve section 19 of the U. S. Criminal Code. On the question of
whether Congress had power to control primary elections, four judges held
in the affirmative and four in the negative, the fifth judge refusing to take
part.
12. But see Grovey v. Townsend (1935) 295 U. S. 45 which held that
the 14th and 15th amendments did not prevent a political party from deter-
mining who might vote in that party's primary.
13. For uncritical approval of the result of the instant case on these
grounds, see Note (1941) 4 La. L. Rev. 133.
14. See Guinn v. U. S. (1915) 238 U. S. 347 involving amendment XV;
Nixon v. Herndon (1927) 273 U. S. 536; Nixon v. Condon (1932) 286
U. S. 73, both involving amendment XIV.
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(2) that a statute, especially a criminal statute, must have been directed to-
ward acts within the contemplation of the legislature when enacted.' 5
There is considerable force to the first branch of the dissent when it is
remembered that Art. I, including section 2, deals with the organization and
powers of Congress and not, as do some other provisions of the Constitution,
with individual rights and privileges as such.18 So too, the second branch
of the dissent is in keeping with the desirable policy of narrowly construing
criminal statutes rather than extending their text beyond their context at
the time of enactment.' 7  J. E.
COPYRIGHT-FAIR US--FEDERAL RoLs-[Federal]. -Plaintiff, the New
York Herald-Tribune, editorially defended Wendell L. Wiikie, the Repub-
lican presidential candidate, against charges that he was closely associated
with Wall Street. In a communication to the newspaper, defendant, Otis &
Company, reprimanded it for assuming that any affiliation was to be dis-
avowed. This letter was acknowledged but never referred to in the news-
paper. Thereupon the defendant addressed a circular letter to a select list
of public officials, bankers, educators, economists, and other persons, en-
closing a photostatic copy of the editorial page, including the masthead,
of plaintiff's copyrighted newspaper. Plaintiffs brought an action for al-
leged infringement of copyright and trademark. The defendant filed mo-
tions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings, supported by affdavits
claiming "fair use" of the copyrighted material. Held: The determination
of "fair use" is not to be decided on motion and affidavits, but is to be left
to the trial judge on the merits of the case. New York Tiibune v. Otis &
Company.,
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(b),2 permit some objec-
tions to the contentions of an opposing party to be raised by a motion for
summary judgment supported by affidavits. The decision in the instant
case, however, goes no further than to hold that "fair use" is a defense
of such complexity, and so dependent upon particular facts, that it can be
raised only by answer and proved only in a full trial before judge or jury.
The decision seems reasonable, when the vagueness of the conception
15. See United States v. Gradwell (1917) 243 U. S. 476 in which the
court held that conspiracies to defraud in a primary election are not within
the purview of §19 of the Criminal Code, because when §19 was passed by
Congress, primary elections were unknown in the law.
16. U. S. Const. Amend. XIV. See Nixon v. Herndon (1927) 273 U. S.
536; Nixon v. Condon (1932) 286 U. S. 73; note 12, supra; U. S. Const.
Amend. XV. See Guinn v. U. S. (1915) 238 U. S. 347, note 12, supra. These
cases were thus distinguished by Mr. Justice Douglas in dissent, 61 S. Ct.
1030, 1046.
17. McBoyle v. U. S. (1931) 283 U. S. 25.
1. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 67.
2. "FoR DEFENDING PARTY. A party against whom a claim, counter-
claim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may,
at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof."
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